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ABSTRACT 
Across the developed world, including Australia, public policymaking now rests heavily on 
commissioned reports generated by for-profit consultants, contrasting starkly with the earlier 
customary reliance on the civil service to provide informed policy advice to political decision 
makers. Dependence on commercial consultants is problematic, especially given the moral hazards 
involved in ‘hired guns’ providing support for policy ‘solutions’ desired by their political paymasters. 
This paper provides a vivid illustration of the some of the dangers flowing from the use of 
consultants by examining the methodology employed by KPMG in its empirical analysis of the 
pecuniary consequences of proposed municipal mergers as part of the New South Wales’ (NSW) 
Government’s Fit for the Future local government reform program. We show that the KPMG (2016) 
modelling methodology is awash with errors which render its conclusions on the financial viability 
of the NSW merger proposals fatally flawed. 
1. Introduction
Halligan (1995) advanced the notion of ‘policy advisory systems’ as a conceptual tool for 
interpreting the sources of policy advice relied on by public agencies in the policy-making process. 
Craft and Howlett (2013, p.187) have observed that policy advisory systems ‘arise in almost every 
instance of decision-making whereby governments receive advice not just from professional analysts 
in their employ or from outside groups, but also from a range of other actors, from think tanks and 
lobbyists, but also from partisan political advisors, scientific, technical and legal experts, and many 
others both inside and outside of government’. A substantial scholarly literature has evolved around 
the examination of policy advisory systems, which includes an Australian strand (see, for instance, 
Weller and Stevens, 1998).  
While the empirical analysis of the supply of policy advice and its ‘externalization’ has attracted 
some attention from researchers (Bevir and Rhodes, 2001), unfortunately comparatively little is 
known about policy advice emanating from the commercial consulting industry, sometimes termed 
  
the ‘invisible public sector’ (Boston, 1994; Speers, 2007; Howlett and Migone, 2013; Vesely, 2013), 
despite its growing dominance in many areas of public policymaking, including Australian local 
government. In particular, empirical scholars of contemporary Australian local government policy 
making have virtually ignored the positive analysis of the quality of technical reports by for-profit 
consultant companies, with the notable exception of the Drew, Kortt and Dollery (2013) analysis of 
Deloitte Access Economics’ (2011) Local Government Structural Reform in Tasmania.   
Although the paucity of analysis into the quality of consultant reports may be explained by the 
difficulties involved in its assessment (see, for example, Gregory and Lonti, 2008), questions of 
quality nonetheless remain paramount given the pivotal importance of consultant reports in policy 
formulation by public agencies. The present paper seeks to address the lack of empirical analysis on 
the quality of commercial consultant technical reports on Australian local government policymaking 
by critically examining KPMG’s (2016) Outline of Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local 
Government Merger Proposals, which was commissioned by the New South Wales (NSW) 
Government.  
It is worth noting at the outset that concern over the growing use of for-profit commercial consulting 
as a major or even sole source of policy advice should be tempered by reflecting on ‘counterfactual’ 
alternatives. While in an ideal world ‘frank and fearless’ policy advice would be offered by highly-
trained and impartial public sector bureaucrats unencumbered by bias of any kind and unmoved by 
the ‘moral hazards’ facing their commercial counterparts, a substantial literature on government 
failure, including ‘bureaucratic failure’, suggests an alternative view (see, for example, Wallis and 
Dollery 1999; Mueller 2003; Dolfsma 2013; for surveys of the government failure paradigm).  In 
particular, it has been argued that bureaucratic failure may be pervasive and policy advice may be 
less disinterested and technically sound than commonly assumed (Wolf, 1989). If this is indeed the 
case in contemporary government departments and public agencies, then ‘outsourced’ policy advice 
may be preferable to its ‘in-house’ counterpart.   
  
 
KPMG (2016) sets out in detail the methodology employed in KPMG’s (2015) Local Government 
Reform: Merger Impacts and Analysis, prepared for the NSW Government, which computed the 
financial benefits and costs which would purportedly flow from the proposed compulsory council 
consolidation in the NSW Government’s Fit for the Future local government reform process. Under 
this program, the Baird Government has proposed 35 council mergers across both metropolitan and 
country NSW local government (Abelson and Joyeux, 2015; Drew and Dollery, 2014c; 
2015).KPMG’s (2016) Outline of Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local Government Merger 
Proposals plays a critical role in the Baird Government’s forced amalgamation program since it sets 
out the only publicly available detail for the basis on which KPMG calculated the purported financial 
advantages attached to the specific council mergers proposed by the Baird Government. If KPMG 
(2016) can be shown to contain material error which renders the estimated financial advantages of 
particular proposed municipal mergers invalid, then this seriously undermines the fiscal foundations 
of the overall amalgamation program. Moreover, the delegated agents of the Boundary Commission 
(which is the body charged by statute to evaluate amalgamation proposals) relied almost entirely on 
the KPMG modelling in making their recommendations to the Minister regarding whether the 
proposed amalgamations should proceed. Whether it was reasonable to place reliance on the KPMG 
modelling is now a matter being argued before the Courts by councils opposing the forced 
amalgamations (Sansom, 2016). 
 
Over the past few decades, every Australian state and territory administration has implemented 
forced mergers, with the sole omission of Western Australia, where the Barnett Government recently 
and unsuccessfully sought to impose compulsory council consolidation upon reluctant Perth 
councils. The Baird Government’s controversial Fit for the Future forced amalgamation program is 
thus by no means unusual in Australian local government milieu nor is its reliance on for-profit 
  
consultants KPMG at all uncommon (Dollery, Grant and Kortt, 2012). Indeed, in 2004 the (then) 
Carr Government implemented a radical program of municipal mergers in NSW, centred largely on 
non-metropolitan councils. 
In this paper our analysis of KPMG’s (2016) Outline of Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local 
Government Merger Proposals is divided into three main parts. Section 2 provides a synoptic 
account of Fit for the Future reform process in NSW local government by way of institutional 
background. Section 3 critically examines the KPMG (2016) report. The paper ends with some brief 
concluding remarks in section 4. 
2. New South Wales Local Government Reform Process 
The largest of the seven Australian state and territory local government jurisdictions, NSW local 
government is currently comprised of 152 ‘general purpose councils’, 12 ‘special purpose councils’ 
as well as the NSW Aboriginal Land Council. NSW local authorities fall under a regulatory system 
made up of the NSW Office of Local Government (OLG), the NSW Independent Pricing and 
Regulatory Tribunal (IPART), NSW Boundaries Commission (when constituted), NSW Local 
Government Grants Commission and auxiliary bodies, together with the NSW Local Government 
Act (1993) as amended. NSW local government is a ‘creature of statute’ in common with other 
Australian local government systems, given that the NSW Government possesses extensive 
regulatory powers over local councils. 
In comparison with most other developed nations, local government in Australia performs a limited 
range of functions, focused largely on ‘services to property’. In contrast to most other local 
government systems, it does not provide many ‘services to people’, such as education and policing, 
which are run by state and territory governments. NSW local government is funded through property 
taxes, fees and charges for services, intergovernmental grants, developer charges and various other 
minor sources. NSW local authorities deliver local infrastructure, including local roads, and local 
services, such as sewage and solid waste disposal, with some regional councils operating local water 
  
utilities. NSW local councils fall under elected councillors and (typically) indirectly elected mayors, 
who face four-year electoral cycles. The operational aspects of councils are run by a general manager 
who oversees a professional bureaucracy. 
The Fit for the Future NSW local government reform process has its origins in the Destination 2036 
Workshop held on 19
th
 August 2011 in the regional centre of Dubbo held under (then) Minister for 
Local Government Don Page. It was attended by local government councillors and general managers 
from all NSW local authorities. Destination 2036 led to the formation of the Independent Local 
Government Review Panel (ILGRP) and the Local Government Acts Taskforce. Given an election 
promise of ‘no forced amalgamation’ by the incoming Coalition government, the Panel’s terms of 
reference precluded forced mergers. In April 2013, the ILGRP released its interim report entitled 
Future Directions for NSW Local Government. Despite its terms of reference, in Future Directions, 
the Panel (2013a, p.48) proposed extensive council mergers, but largely concentrated on Greater 
Sydney. Future Directions (2013a, p 5) recommended that the NSW Government ‘reduce the 
number of councils in the Sydney basin to around 15, and create major new cities of Sydney, 
Parramatta and Liverpool, each with populations of 600-800,000’. Despite assurances that it would 
follow ‘evidence-based’ policymaking, the Panel offered no empirical evidence in support of its 
compulsory municipal mergers recommendation. 
Future Directions was widely attacked. Critics focused not only on the absence of empirical 
evidence for the proposed merger program, but also on the quality of the little commissioned 
research used by the Panel. Assessing Processes and Outcomes of the 2004 Local Government 
Boundary Changes in NSW by Jeff Tate Consulting (2013) drew scathing commentary for relying 
entirely on discussions with people from only five of the 27 councils amalgamated in 2004 (Drew 
and Dollery, 2016), instead of comparing the post-consolidation performance of merged and 
unmerged councils in the same municipal classification categories against the NSW Government 
  
Comparative Information on NSW Local Government Councils data and/or the TCorp (2013) 
financial ratios, subsequently readjusted as Fit for the Future performance indicators. 
 
After a round of public consultation, the Panel submitted its final report Revitalising Local 
Government in October 2013. The chief dissimilarities between Future Directions and Revitalising 
Local Government lay in a shift in emphasis on the proposed process for merging councils. Instead 
of outright compulsion, Revitalising Local Government proposed that a ‘strengthened’ Boundaries 
Commission evaluate merger proposals and make binding recommendations. This process 
approximated existing provisions in the NSW Local Government Act (1993).  
However, in common with Future Directions, Revitalising Local Government still claimed that 
municipal mergers were vital as a means of improving NSW local government without furnishing 
any empirical evidence. Various other similarities between Future Directions and Revitalising Local 
Government are striking. For example, in its assessment of NSW local government financial 
sustainability, Future Directions (2013a, p. 6) noted that ‘it is also clear that the financial base of the 
sector is in urgent need of repair’, observing that ‘put simply, there are too many councils chasing 
too few resources’. Revitalizing Local Government echoed this slogan, with the Panel (2013b, p. 
720) claiming that ‘NSW simply cannot sustain 152 councils’. 
The NSW Government only released Revitalising Local Government in January 2014. After the 
resignation of Premier O’Farrell in April 2014, incoming Premier Baird replaced Minister Page with 
Minister Toole as Minister for Local Government. This Cabinet reshuffle may account for the fact 
that the NSW Government only publically responded to Revitalising Local Government in 
September 2014 by launching its Fit for the Future (OLG, 2014b; 2014c) reform package.  
All of the council mergers recommended by the Panel were accepted by Fit for the Future, which 
offered no further empirical evidence. Fit for the Future laid out a ‘self-assessment’ procedure by 
  
which each local authority would evaluate itself against a number of performance indicators. Local 
councils were obliged to submit ‘merge’ and/or ‘stand-alone’ proposals to the OLG by 30 June 2015. 
In terms of the initial Fit for the Future procedure, proposals would be judged by an Expert Panel. 
However, on 27 April 2015 the Minister Toole declared that IPART, augmented by commercial 
consultant John Comrie, would constitute an ‘Expert Advisory Panel’ to assess council submissions. 
The Minister simultaneously released Methodology for Assessment of Council Fit for the Future 
Proposals: Local Government Consultation Paper April 2015. This document indicated that IPART 
would assess local council submissions using criteria different from the earlier Fit for the Future 
criteria. Methodology for Assessment of Council Fit for the Future Proposals called for submissions 
on its suggested criteria.  
On 5 June 2015, IPART (2015b) released Methodology for the Assessment of Council Fit for the 
Future Proposals, only 25 days from the 30 June 2015 deadline for council submissions under the 
Fit for the Future. Methodology for the Assessment of Council Fit for the Future Proposals set out 
IPART’s response to submissions on Methodology for Assessment of Council Fit for the Future 
Proposals, in conjunction with its final assessment criteria.  
The NSW OLG’s Fit for the Future program had been based on seven criteria which local authorities 
were obligated to address in submissions to the OLG. However, by changing these criteria 
Methodology for the Assessment of Council Fit for the Future Proposals at a stroke rendered 
obsolete much of the Fit for the Future program on which local authorities had expended 
considerable resources. In particular, the Fit for the Future criteria were supplanted by new measures 
in Methodology for Assessment of Council Fit for the Future Proposals, together with an over-
arching ‘adequate scale and capacity’ criterion. 
Given the harsh time constraints, Methodology for Assessment of Council Fit for the Future 
Proposals placed NSW local government in invidious circumstances. Prior to its release, local 
  
authorities across NSW had spent considerable effort consulting with local communities and 
preparing ‘merge’, ‘stand-alone’ and ‘rural council’ proposals on the basis of the Fit for the Future 
process and its assessment criteria. These exertions were now rendered irrelevant. Furthermore, too 
little time remained for local authorities to repeat (a) a thorough community engagement process and 
(b) prepare submissions using the new Methodology for Assessment of Council Fit for the Future 
Proposals. In addition, the new IPART (2015b) assessment criteria and benchmarks were seriously 
flawed (USU, 2015). 
On 20th October 2015, IPART (2015c) released its Assessment of Council Fit for the Future 
Proposals with its decisions on the fate of individual local councils. In all, IPART (2015c) 
considered 139 local council submissions from a total of 144 councils, encompassing  four ‘merger’ 
proposals (concerning nine municipalities), 115 ‘council improvement’ proposals and twenty ‘rural 
council’ proposals. Under an earlier Panel recommendation, eight Far West NSW shires had not 
been obligated to submit proposals.  
In sum, IPART assessed 52 (37%) proposals as ‘fit for the future’ and 87 (63%) as not ‘fit for the 
future’. Of the latter group, 60 councils were deemed not to have adequate ‘scale and capacity’ but 
met the financial criteria, 18 had sufficient ‘scale and capacity’ but were not financially ‘fit’, and 
nine had both inadequate ‘scale and capacity’ and failed on financial criteria. All four ‘merger’ 
proposals were assessed as ‘fit for the future’ (IPART, 2015c). 
On 18
th
 December 2015, the NSW Government announced its decision on municipal mergers. It 
recommended the creation of 35 local councils through forced mergers. Fifteen of these 
amalgamations were in Greater Sydney, reducing the number of Sydney councils from 43 to 25. The 
remaining 20 councils were in regional NSW, decreasing country councils from 109 to 87. It is 
striking that little correspondence exists between the IPART (2015c) determinations on specific local 
authorities and the 35 councils proposed for amalgamation by the NSW Government. It has been 
suggested that political considerations played a major role in the NSW Government decisions.  
  
Minister Toole (2015) claimed that ‘each proposal was the result of careful consideration of all the 
evidence, including four years of consultation with every council in NSW, independent assessments, 
merger preferences submitted by councils, and feedback communities and stakeholders’. He 
observed that - under the Local Government Act (1993) - the 35 proposals would be examined by 
appointed Delegates, through a public consultation process, and then referred to Boundaries 
Commission for final recommendations. In terms of the Local Government Act (1993), the Minister 
is not obliged to accept these recommendations and retains the final decision. 
In January 2016, the NSW Government published a brief ‘merger proposal’ for each of the 35 
proposed municipal mergers which summarised the purported benefits attendant upon amalgamation, 
including estimates of pecuniary savings from 2020 onwards. These estimates were developed by 
KPMG (2015) in its Local Government Reform: Merger Impacts and Analysis. According to the 
NSW Government, KPMG (2015) had demonstrated that savings would primarily flow from the 
‘removal of duplicate back office and administrative functions’, the ‘streamlining of senior 
management roles’, increased purchasing power for ‘materials and contracts’, and lower outlays on 
councillor fees. 
However, the NSW Government refused to release Local Government Reform, even to Delegates 
assessing specific merger proposals, classifying it as “Cabinet in confidence’. Instead, under intense 
political pressure, it released KPMG’s (2016) Outline of Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local 
Government Merger Proposals Technical Paper1. In this document KPMG (2016) set out in the 
methodology employed by KPMG (2015) in its Local Government Reform: Merger Impacts and 
Analysis. We now consider in detail Outline of Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local 
Government Merger Proposals Technical Paper. 
3. Evaluation of KPMG (2016) Methodology  
                                                     
1 The Baird Government even voted down a Parliamentary motion calling for the release of KPMG (2015) and other 
documents related to the forced amalgamation program on 25 February 2016. 
  
3.1 Generic Problems with KPMG (2016) Methodology 
Three major generic problems are evident in Outline of Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local 
Government Merger Proposals Technical Paper. In the first place, no verifiable empirical evidence 
is provided in support of claims on savings expected to arise from specific municipal mergers. In 
most cases, savings are simply claimed with no effort made to justify why these dollars values (or 
percentage equivalents) were chosen. Without evidence that similar savings have been achieved in 
other Australian state jurisdictions, or indeed in the 2004 NSW amalgamation program, the KPMG 
(2016) assumptions are simply guesswork. In the absence of any credible evidence that similar 
savings have been achieved in previous mergers, there is thus no reason for the public to have any 
confidence in the KPMG (2015) modelling. 
KPMG ignored the most relevant empirical evidence on the potential savings arising from NSW 
amalgamations which derives from the financial data subsequent to the March 2008 Queensland 
forced mergers. Unfortunately, because the Queensland amalgamations occurred part way through a 
financial year it is not possible to generate reliable and comparable evidence of initial savings in 
employee expense. However, it is possible to track the audited financial data to ascertain (a) whether 
it is reasonable to expect large reductions in employee expenses following the three-year moratorium 
after forced amalgamations and (b) whether initial savings in staff expenditure might have been 
eroded by subsequent higher rates of growth amongst the merged cohort of councils. It is important 
to note that Queensland also employed a moratorium on forced redundancies for the first three years. 
Table 1 provides details of the mean annualised growth in staff expenditure disaggregated into 
‘amalgamated’ and ‘non-amalgamated’ cohorts of Queensland councils. The periods cited are the 
financial years and all rows relate to the average annualised rate of growth since the end of the 2009 
financial year. Thus, the last row contains six periods of growth. Growth is presented in nominal 
terms in order to avoid possible errors in inflating the data
i
.  
TABLE 1 COMES HERE 
  
It is thus clear that there is no sound reason to expect a significant and enduring reduction in staff 
expenditure after the expiration of the moratorium on forced redundancy. Moreover, it is obvious 
that the average annualised rate of growth for the amalgamated cohort has been greater than that of 
the non-merged cohort for all of the years in Table 1 and this difference shows no sign of dissipating. 
It is thus most unlikely that additional savings assumed by KPMG will occur after the moratorium on 
forced amalgamation. We also note that s218CA(2) of the Local Government Act (1993) seems to 
impose enduring constraints on staff redundancies in rural centres, which makes the assumed savings 
even less likely. In addition, the evidence from the audited financial statements of Queensland 
councils seems to suggest that initial savings arising from the termination of senior management may 
well be eroded by faster annualised rates of growth in employee expenditure over the foreseeable 
future.  
Secondly, Outline of Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local Government Merger Proposals 
Technical Paper is replete with errors and inconsistencies. Problems include inconsistencies with 
recent KPMG reports on NSW local government, incompatibilities with official reports, like the 
Local Government Remuneration Tribunal Report, errors of logic, gross oversimplifications and 
errors in data selection. It is especially troubling that the KPMG assumptions have been applied to 
the very broad categories of ‘metropolitan’ and ‘regional’ councils. Not only is this inaccurate (see 
Drew and Dollery, 2014), but the NSW Office of Local Government time series data employs 11 
categories. These categories are applied by the NSW Local Government Grants Commission to 
calculate an isolation allowance specific to each non-metropolitan council. Furthermore, the NSW 
Local Government Remuneration Tribunal employs nine different categories. 
A noteworthy error in KPMG (2016) resides in the fact that KPMG (2016, p.7) appears to have 
based its costings for redundancies flowing from mergers on the Commonwealth Fair Work Act 
2009 National Employment Standards termination pay schedule. However, NSW local government 
falls under the Local Government (State) Award 2014 and its redundancy provisions. This makes a 
  
substantial difference to the costings. For example, under the Commonwealth Fair Work Act 2009, 
an employee with ten or more years’ service is entitled to 12 weeks’ pay, whereas under the NSW 
Local Government (State) Award 2014 the same employee will receive 34 weeks’ pay or 183% 
more. Given the substantial impost of redundancy costs following the three-year post-merger 
employment protection period, this means that KPMG (2016) has severely under-estimated the costs 
of amalgamation. 
Finally, quite apart from these errors and inconsistences, Outline of Financial Modelling 
Assumptions for Local Government Merger Proposals Technical Paper is noteworthy for its neglect 
of important cost considerations. For example, as we show in Table 2 below, KPMG (2016) have 
ignored the post-merger costs of service equalisation across the local authorities which have been 
merged. It is well known that significant differences exist in the level and quality of service delivery 
in NSW local government between different councils, even those in the same NSW Office of Local 
Government council classification category. As experience in the 2008 Queensland amalgamation 
program has demonstrated, post-merger service provision is typically equalised upwards and this 
carries substantial costs. It should be stressed that service harmonisation of this kind applies to all 
services in the amalgamated council since it is hard to justify employing a common rating system 
with differentiated service levels. For example, Dallinger (2014) examined the newly merged 
Moreton Bay Regional Council and showed inter alia that – across the board – local services had 
been adjusted upwards in the new entity. Ignoring these costs means that the KPMG (2015) 
calculations substantially understate the costs of amalgamation.   
3.2 Specific Problems with KPMG (2016) Methodology 
In addition to these generic problems with an Outline of Financial Modelling Assumptions for Local 
Government Merger Proposals Technical Paper, it is possible to identify a host of specific problems. 
In order to economize on space constraints, we examine these specific problems in Table 2 below: 
 
  
Table 2: Specific Problems with KPMG (2016) Methodology 
 
KPMG Assumption Comment 
Failure to Model Financial 
Assistance Grants (FAGs) 
Changes 
Financial Assistance Grants (FAGs) are only subject to 
constraints imposed as a result of the 7 February 2006 
proclamation under subsection 6(4) of the 
Commonwealth legislation for a period of four years. 
The KPMG (2016) modelling does not appear to respond 
to the Local Government (Financial Assistance) Act 
(1995) (CTH) in any way. 
This is disturbing given that FAGs account for around a 
tenth of council revenue on average. Failure to model 
changes to FAGs risks over-estimating revenue (after 
four years) and thus over-estimating the savings arising 
from the mergers. 
Treatment of Councils that are 
Split in a Merger 
 
‘A council that is split has its 
financial statements… split on 
a per capita basis’ (KPMG, 
2016, .p.8)  
This is an entirely inequitable method of dividing assets 
with the potential to lead to unanticipated deleterious 
outcomes (see Drew and Dollery, 2014a). Indeed, the 
inequitable division of assets resulted – in part - in acute 
fiscal stress for breakaway councils in the Delatite Shire 
de-amalgamation in Victoria and the subsequent 
Queensland demergers.  
‘Councils that are part of a 
merger but lose a portion of its 
area to another merger cluster 
…will have its financial 
statement adjusted to reflect 
reduced revenue/expenditure 
profile. These adjustments are 
generally made on a per capita 
basis’ (KPMG, 2016, p.8). 
This is the entirely fallacious method for adjusting 
revenue and expenditure. Rates are not levied on a per 
capita basis, but on a per assessment basis. Thus, the 
major portion of revenue apportionment must clearly be 
conducted on a per assessment basis. This data is readily 
available from the NSW OLG Time Series data. 
Moreover, as demonstrated by Drew and Dollery 
(2014b), the relevant functional unit for municipal 
expenditure analysis is the number of assessments, not 
absolute population which is erroneously employed by 
KPMG (2016). 
Savings from Materials and 
Contracts Expenditure 
 
KPMG claim that ‘savings’ will 
apply to 80% of the category 
‘Materials and Contracts 
No evidence is provided to support these ‘assumptions’. 
KPMG (2016) implicitly assumes that amalgamating 
  
Expenditure’ and will be 
‘phased in’ over 3 years. 
councils have not entered into long-term contracts for 
the receipt of materials and services (or that the services 
are not already the subject of larger regional 
collaborations). Furthermore, there is no justification 
provided for the staged implementation of savings from 
‘materials and contract expenditure’. The net effect of 
these assumptions is to overestimate savings. 
Value of efficiency saving 
assumed to be 3% for 
metropolitan councils and 2% 
for regional councils. 
No empirical evidence is provided to support of these 
assumptions. Moreover, in its other reports for NSW 
councils, KPMG has used different assumptions. For 
example, in its Bombala Council, Cooma-Monaro Shire 
Council and Snowy River Shire Council Merger 
Business Case (1 May 2015), KPMG stated that ‘a 1.5 
per cent saving on Materials and Contract expenses has 
been applied’ (KPMG, 2015, p.21). 
KPMG needs to explain why its present estimate differs 
from the estimate provided by it just eight months 
earlier. 
In addition, Ernst and Young (2015) report that the 
KPMG analysis of Pittwater and Manly assumed a 
materials and contracts efficiency of 2% (and not 3%). 
Moreover, other for-profit consultants have used 
different values in NSW. Thus, Morrison and Low 
employ a number of different assumptions for 
efficiencies derived from materials and contracts which 
range from 1% through to 5%. There is thus no clear 
consensus on the likely savings in this expenditure 
category. 
Finally, if savings are possible in the procurement of 
materials and contracts and KPMG (2016) is correct in 
asserting that savings ‘are subject to scale’, then it 
follows that a system of centralised procurement for the 
entire state – along the lines employed in Queensland by 
the Queensland Local Government Association (LGAQ) 
- would produce far greater savings than any single 
amalgamation. Moreover, councils not subject to 
amalgamation would be able to share in KPMG’s (2016) 
assumed savings. State-wide procurement thus 
represents a far superior method of realising these 
savings than expensive mergers.  
Savings from Councillor  
  
Expenditure 
KPMG (2016, p. 2) notes that  
‘the number of councillors for a 
new merged entity mirror the 
highest number of councillors 
that currently exist in any one 
of the councils participating in 
the merger’. 
This statement does not reflect the maximum number of 
councillors allowable under the Local Government Act 
(1993). Thus KPMG (2016) is asserting that there will 
be a reduction in the level of democratic representation 
for merged councils. Moreover, this procedure for 
determining the number of councillors will inevitably 
lead to very disparate levels of democratic representation 
between merged and unmerged councils. 
KPMG (2016, p. 3) notes that 
‘this figure is grown at a 
standard wage growth rate of 
2.3 per cent over the period’  
This is inconsistent with the 2015 Local Government 
Remuneration Tribunal determination.  The NSW 
Remuneration Tribunal (2015, p. 14) made the following 
observation: ‘the Tribunal has reviewed the key 
economic indicators, including the Consumer Price 
Index and Wage Price Index, and finds that the full 
increase of 2.5 per cent available to it is warranted’.  
KPMG (2016, p. 3) noted that 
‘this [sic] savings are offset by 
the assumption that all newly 
elected councillors (metro and 
regional) will receive a fee of 
$30,000 per annum’. 
The most recent determination for councillor and 
mayoral fees includes nine different rates (depending on 
the categorisation of council in the NSW OLG 
classification system). For instance, ‘county councils 
other’ councillor fees are set at a minimum of $1,660 
and a maximum of $5,490. The ‘county council other’ 
mayoral fees range from a minimum of $3,550 through 
to a maximum of $10,020. 
By way of contrast, councillor fees for ‘principal city’ 
councils range from $25,040 through to $36,720, whilst 
mayoral fees for the same category range from $153,200 
through to $201,580. 
It should thus be clear that an assumption of $30,000 for 
every council is deeply flawed. Moreover, KPMG 
(2016) has not attempted to differentiate between 
savings relating to mayors as opposed to councillors. 
Savings from Reduced Salary 
and Wage Expenditure 
 
KPMG (2016, p. 3) notes that 
‘staffing reductions are 
assumed to occur gradually 
with a modest level of 
voluntary attrition in the first 
three years of amalgamation’. 
No empirical evidence is provided by KPMG (2016) to 
support this claim. 
In fact, as we have seen from the 2008 Queensland 
merger process in section 3.1 above, total staff 
expenditure for the amalgamated cohort of councils in 
Queensland rose for each of the three full financial years 
  
following the 2008 amalgamations. This is clear from 
evidence obtained from audited financial statements of 
each of the affected councils, in addition to the 
Queensland Department of Infrastructure and Planning 
Queensland Local Government Comparative 
Information 2008-2009. 
Moreover, the average annualised rate of growth in staff 
expenditure for the amalgamated cohort in Queensland 
(7.795% p.a.) was far higher than that of the non-
amalgamated cohort (6.031% p.a.) in nominal terms for 
the first three full financial years. 
KPMG (2016) claims there will 
be savings from Tier 4 and Tier 
3 positions 
KPMG (2016) do not state what rate of savings was used 
for these senior management positions. However, given 
that General Manager and Director entitlements are the 
subject of individually negotiated contracts, it is highly 
unlikely that modelling employing a single rate of 
savings would be in any way satisfactory or reflective of 
what will occur in a specific merger. 
KPMG (2016, p. 3) claim that 
‘overall staffing efficiencies 
were estimated at 7.4 per cent 
for metropolitan mergers… 
[and] 3.7 to 5 per cent’ for 
regional councils’. 
No evidence has been provided by KPMG (2016) to 
support this critical claim. 
The efficiency estimate for regional councils (3.7 to 5 
per cent) by KPMG (2016) in January 2016 differs 
markedly from the estimate provided by KPMG (2015, 
p.21) to Snowy River, Bombala and Cooma-Monaro 
‘estimated to be approximately 6 per cent on a FTE 
basis’. 
KPMG should explain why this estimate has changed so 
markedly in the past eight months. 
Actual empirical evidence based on the entire cohort of 
Queensland councils suggests that little or no 
efficiencies relating to employee costs can be reasonably 
expected. Based on seven full financial years of data 
following the Queensland mergers, the average 
annualised rate of growth in employee expense is far 
higher for the amalgamated cohort (4.997% p.a.) than 
the non-amalgamated cohort (3.724% p.a.). In making 
these calculations, we have not made any claims about 
initial savings made as a result of terminating senior 
appointments. Our data relates to the rate of change in 
employee expense for the full financial years following 
amalgamation. Queensland also had a moratorium on 
  
forced redundancies for a period of three years. 
Merger Cost Components  
ICT costs Evidence for the KPMG (2016) ICT assumptions is cited 
as a ‘select number of industry representatives consulted 
by DPC’ and ‘analysis undertaken by KPMG based on 
advisory services to Queensland local councils involved 
in de-amalgamations’ (KPMG, 2016, p. 5). 
However, details of the industry experts consulted and 
the estimates which they advised should be disclosed for 
full transparency. 
The reference to KPMG analysis for the de-
amalgamations is curious, given that the figures cited in 
the modelling assumptions (ranging from $2.26m 
through to $3.35m) are completely at odds with 
estimates cited by the Queensland Treasury Corporation 
which had ‘engaged KPMG to estimate the information 
and communication technology costs of de-
amalgamation’ (QTC, 2012, p. 16). 
The QTC (2012) estimate for the de-amalgamation of 
Sunshine Coast Regional Council was $1,176,000 (QTC, 
2012, p. 16). 
‘Transition costs are estimated 
to be 2 per cent of a merged 
entity operating expenditure in 
the first year of operation’ 
(KPMG, 2016, p. 6) 
No evidence is provided to support this claim. 
However, Drew and Dollery (2015) noted that the 
Queensland Treasury Corporation (QTC) (2009) Review 
of Local Government Amalgamation Costs Funding 
Submission: Final Summary Report had gathered 
information from councils forcibly merged in 
Queensland in August 2007. 
Reported ‘first-round’ costs were $9.3 million (mean) 
for metropolitan councils and $7.994 million (mean) for 
regional/rural councils’ (Drew and Dollery, 2015, p. 3).  
There is no evidence of an association between 
amalgamation costs and operating expenditure as 
hypothesised by KPMG (2016). 
Costs from redundancies  
Redundancies The KPMG claim is predicated on the assumption that 
(a) there will be redundancies after the three-year 
moratorium, and (b) that senior staff contracts include 
redundancy clauses. 
  
However, this claim appears to ignore the constraints 
imposed on redundancies for rural centres outlined in 
s218CA(2) of the Local Government Act (1993). 
Empirical evidence from the Queensland amalgamations 
calls into question assumptions regarding redundancies 
(see discussion above on Savings from Reduced Salary 
and Wage Expenditure). 
KPMG (2016, p. 7) claimed 
that ‘based on established 
practices and the average tenure 
for the sector, the redundancy 
payment would be provided for 
sixteen (16) weeks’.  Reference 
is then made to the ‘Fair Work 
Ombudsman (2014), 
Redundancy pay and 
entitlements schedule’. 
 
As we have demonstrated in section 2 (iv), local 
Government general staff in NSW are covered by the 
Local Government (State) Award, not a federal award as 
apparently ‘assumed’ by KPMG. Employees are entitled 
to up to 34 weeks of pay (for employees of 10 years 
standing or higher) on a scale associated with the 
number of years of service. 
An assumption of 16 weeks (equivalent to the 
entitlement of an employee with 4 to 5 years of service 
in terms of the table on redundancy entitlements in NSW 
Local Government (State) Award 2014, p.308) is a gross 
oversimplification. It amounts to an assumption that the 
average person laid off has a period of service of just 
over 4 years. This does not reflect the reality of local 
government employment in NSW, especially in country 
councils, where employees typically have long periods 
of service. 
 
It is apparent from Table 2 that the analysis in KPMG (2016) is flawed in a number of respects. 
Perhaps most concerning is that the authors of KPMG (2016) seem unaware of a number of 
fundamental characteristics of Australian (and NSW) local government. For example, it is decidedly 
odd that KPMG (2016) was oblivious to the freeze on FAGs, determinations by the Local 
Government Remuneration Tribunal, and the NSW Local Government (State) Award. In addition, it 
is puzzling that KPMG (2016) is inconsistent with recent other reports undertaken by KPMG on 
NSW councils, as in the  Bombala Council, Cooma-Monaro Shire Council and Snowy River Shire 
Council Merger Business Case (KPMG, 2015). Finally, it is obvious that KPMG is not aware of the 
substantial empirical literature on Australian local government amalgamations, such as Drew and 





Two major conclusions flow from our analysis. Firstly, we have demonstrated that the methodology 
provided in KPMG (2016) is deeply flawed. It follows that the analyses of all of the specific mergers 
which have been examined by KPMG (2015) in its Local Government Reform: Merger Impacts and 
Analysis using this methodology are thus grossly inaccurate and do not reflect the true costs and 
benefits involved. Given that the estimates provided by KPMG for all the recommended mergers are 
erroneous and greatly inflate the financial benefits involved, it is assuredly the case that controversial 
and divisive mergers cannot be prescribed on the basis of demonstrably false financial estimates.  
Secondly, the analysis in this paper supports concerns expressed in the literature, such as Howlett 
and Migone (2013), regarding reliance on policy analysis undertaken by commercial consultants. 
The methodology set out in KPMG (2016) demonstrably overstates the financial benefits contingent 
on the proposed municipal mergers, thereby deliberately bolstering the case for amalgamation.  
Misgivings over the use of the estimates provided by the ‘cost/benefit summaries’ of KPMG’s 
(2015) Local Government Reform: Merger Impacts and Analysis have been amplified by the fact that 
the NSW Government has flatly refused to release the full report and has terminated attempts at 
debating its merits in the NSW Parliament.  
More generally, various options could be considered to ameliorating concerns over the policy advice 
provided by commercial consultants. For example, more than a single commercial consultant could 
be contracted to provide advice on a given policy question. Similarly, in addition to policy advice 
from for-profit consultants, public agencies could simultaneously arrange for ‘in-house’ advice to be 
sought on the same matter. Furthermore, steps could be taken to augment existing ‘in-house’ policy 
expertise by employing specialist skills. Under all of these options, policymakers would not have to 
rely on a single source of advice. 
Notes 
1 The problem with using real rather than nominal data centers around inflating and selecting an appropriate index. 
National CPI relates to a proscribed basket of goods and services, many of which are not used by local government and 
  
thus possess little relevance. By contrast, local government cost indexes are an estimate only, based on an amalgam of 
ABS indexes which may not be reflective of actual municipal costs. For instance one component of the Queensland local 
government cost index is the CPI in Brisbane. In addition, no effort is made in either type of index to identify different 
cost pressures specific to particular regions. Given that we are interested in comparing the growth in expenses between 
two stable cohorts over a number of years, there is in any event no need to inflate data. Apart from the problems of 
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Table 1: Queensland Employee Expense Mean Annual Change, 2009 to 2015 (standard 
deviation in parentheses) 
Period Non-Amalgamated Councils      Amalgamated Councils 
































Source: 2009 data from Queensland Local Government Comparative Information 2008-09, 
Department of Infrastructure and Planning 2010, verified to individual financial statements. All other 
years taken from audited financial statements. Data excludes four councils which were subsequently 
de-amalgamated. 
 
                                                     
 
